Could masked conceptual primes increase recollection? The subtleties of measuring recollection and familiarity in recognition memory  by Taylor, Jason R. & Henson, Richard N.
Neuropsychologia 50 (2012) 3027–3040Contents lists available at SciVerse ScienceDirectNeuropsychologia0028-39
http://d
n Corr
E-m
rik.hensjournal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/neuropsychologiaCould masked conceptual primes increase recollection? The subtleties
of measuring recollection and familiarity in recognition memoryJason R. Taylor n, Richard N. Henson n
MRC Cognition & Brain Sciences Unit, 15 Chaucer Road, Cambridge CB2 7EF, United Kingdoma r t i c l e i n f o
Available online 9 August 2012
Keywords:
Remember/know
Source memory
Context
Episodic
Priming32 & 2012 Elsevier Ltd.
x.doi.org/10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2012.07
esponding authors. Tel.: þ44 1223 355 294;
ail addresses: jason.taylor@mrc-cbu.cam.ac.uk
on@mrc-cbu.cam.ac.uk (R.N. Henson).
Open access under CC Ba b s t r a c t
We begin with a theoretical overview of the concepts of recollection and familiarity, focusing, in the
spirit of this special issue, on the important contributions made by Andrew Mayes. In particular, we
discuss the issue of when the generation of semantically-related information in response to a retrieval
cue might be experienced as recollection rather than familiarity. We then report a series of experiments
in which two different types of masked prime, presented immediately prior to the test cue in a
recognition memory paradigm, produced opposite effects on Remember vs. Know judgments. More
speciﬁcally, primes that were conceptually related to the test item increased the incidence of
Remember judgments, though only when intermixed with repetition primes (which increased the
incidence of Know judgments instead, as in prior studies). One possible explanation—that the ﬂuency
of retrieval of item–context associations can be experienced as recollection, even when the source of
that ﬂuency is unknown—is counter to conventional views of recollection and familiarity, though it was
anticipated by Andrew in his writings nearly two decades ago.
& 2012 Elsevier Ltd. Open access under CC BY license.1 Particularly relevant here is the small set of response options, cf. the open-1. Introduction
We start with a brief review of theoretical and methodological
issues relating to the estimation of recollection and familiarity
within the recognition memory paradigm, before describing new
data that would seem difﬁcult to explain in terms of the dominant
current conception of these two hypothetical processes. In the
review, we focus on the contributions of Andrew Mayes, since few
have considered these issues as deeply as has he. We then apply
these theoretical and methodological considerations to new
experiments using masked priming of test items, which produced
a striking cross-over interaction between conceptual versus
repetition primes and Remember/Know judgments.
1.1. A theoretical overview of recollection and familiarity
in recognition memory
At its simplest, the recognition memory paradigm entails
presenting a participant with a series of items (in a ‘‘study’’
phase), and then later (in a ‘‘test’’ phase), requiring them to make
a two-way decision according to whether each of another series
of items was, or was not, in the study phase. This paradigm has
proved one of the most popular ways to investigate memory over
the last few decades, most likely because of its simplicity, which.029
fax: þ44 1223 359 062.
(J.R. Taylor),
Y license.is particularly helpful for patients with cognitive problems, for
nonhuman animals, and for neuroimaging techniques.1 Whether
this prevalence of the recognition memory paradigm is a good
thing is a matter of debate – we suspect it has rather side-tracked
the ﬁeld (see also Hintzman, 2001) – nonetheless, the extensive
data now accumulated from this paradigm deserve careful theo-
retical consideration.
Atkinson and Juola (1974) were probably the ﬁrst to propose that
participants can base their recognition decision on two, distinct
retrieval processes; an idea that was extended by Mandler (1980),
who introduced the terms recollection and familiarity. Similar ideas
were developed by Humphreys (1978), Tulving (1985), Jacoby
(1991), and others, leading to the popular ‘‘dual-process’’ model of
recognition memory (see Yonelinas, 2002, for review). Since then,
several variants of the basic recognition memory task have been used
in attempts to separate the contributions of familiarity and recollec-
tion. The two main variants, which we consider in more detail below,
are tests of SourceMemory (which subsumes the Process Dissociation
Procedure), and the Remember/Know procedure. However, interpre-
tation of data from these procedures remains a deep and contested
issue (e.g., see Migo, Mayes, & Montaldi, 2012).ended response set in recall paradigms. Open-ended response sets are more prone
to strategic/executive confounds, which may be less available to patients, more
difﬁcult to elicit from nonhuman animals, and normally require spoken or written
output, which tend to introduce movement-related artefacts in many neuroima-
ging techniques (though none of these issues is necessarily insurmountable).
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Fig. 1. Schematic of an example source memory task, in which words are studied
either above or below ﬁxation, and either in green or orange. Two approaches to
judging the source at test are direct episodic retrieval (recollection; upper panel)
or a generate-and-recognise/global match strategy (familiarity; lower panel). See
main text for further explanation.
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and familiarity that we use in this paper. One common distinction
between these concepts is in terms of subjective experience, or
varieties of consciousness, as encapsulated, for example, by Tulving’s
(1985) Remember/Know procedure (see below). We prefer however
to distinguish recollection and familiarity in mechanistic terms
(similar to Greve, Donaldson, & van Rossum, 2010; Norman, 2010;
and even Atkinson & Juola, 1974), derived from a detailed task
analysis. As noted by others, recognition memory for familiar
material (e.g., words) is really a test of contextual recall – not ‘‘have
you seen this item ever before?’’ – but ‘‘did you see it in a speciﬁc
context, i.e., the study phase?’’. Despite this, the task can nonetheless
be solved by an acontextual signal of memory strength, which might
be proportional, for example, to the recency with which an itemwas
last perceived. This is the sense of familiarity used here: a scalar
signal, as might arise from a brain region involved in item percep-
tion/identiﬁcation (e.g., perirhinal cortex, Brown & Xiang, 1998).
We assume that recollection, on the other hand, requires
retrieval of (at least one bit of) new information from the study
phase, that is not present at test. This is the same sense used by
Montaldi and Mayes (2010): ‘‘yrecollection is, therefore, a form of
cued recall’’ (p. 1295)2 . The new information might be represented
as a multidimensional pattern, for example, re-created over a
distributed neural network (Norman & O’Reilly, 2003), in contrast
with a unidimensional match signal derived from that network
(Clark & Gronlund, 1996).
In order to be experienced as recollection, it is often assumed
further that this retrieval of new information occurs within a
dedicated episodic memory system (Schacter & Tulving, 1994), and/or
during a special ‘‘retrieval mode’’ (Tulving, 1983, 1985). Familiarity,
on the other hand, could reﬂect a match signal derived from episodic,
semantic or some other (e.g., perceptual) type of memory system.
Whether a speciﬁc recognition memory decision (such as a correct
source judgment, or a remember judgment) corresponds to retrieval
from episodic memory however, is not necessarily easy to infer (and
runs the risk of circularity). Nonetheless, as expanded below, it is
mechanistically possible to distinguish between direct retrieval of an
episodic trace from episodic memory, versus retrieval from semantic
memory of information associated with the test item, which can then
be ‘‘matched’’ with one or more episodic traces.1.1.1. The subtleties of source memory tasks
Source information refers to the speciﬁc contextual informa-
tion associated with prior exposure to an item that is targeted in a
given task. Thus, in the study phase of a typical source memory
experiment, participants might see each of a sequence of words
displayed above or below a ﬁxation point; then during test, words
would be displayed in the centre of the screen, and participants
would indicate not only whether they recognise the word from
the study phase, but also (when they do recognise it) whether it
was previously presented ‘‘high’’ or ‘‘low’’ on the screen (Fig. 1).
Typically, participants decide between only a handful of source2 One point on which our current conception of recollection might differ from
that of Montaldi and Mayes (2010) relates to their statement: ‘‘[y] if context is
the often repeatedly encountered situational background within which many
different items are experienced, then it is not helpful to describe recollection as
recall of context. Although one might recollect a study context when it is no longer
present, the power of recollection as a recognition diagnostic aid depends
primarily on the recall of unique item associates that occurred within the original
study context’’ (p. 1295). We do not see such uniqueness as a deﬁning feature of
recollection. For example, if a test item brings to mind a detail about the room in
which items were studied (and this detail was not already in mind at test, e.g., by
virtue of being perceived, if the test phase is occurring in the same room, or by
virtue of being retrieved from episodic memory following previous test items),
then we would call this recollection, even if that detail had been associated with
multiple items at study.options (often just two) that are constant throughout the
Test phase.
Various distinctions have been made between different types of
source. Johnson, Hashtroudi, and Lindsay (1993), for example, dis-
tinguished between ‘‘external’’ source – viz information present in
the environment at study, such as the location of a word on a screen
– and ‘‘internal’’ source – viz information generated by the partici-
pant during study, such as which of two mental decisions was made
about an item. A related distinction is whether the contextual
information is bound as part of the representation of the studied
item (‘‘unitised’’), such as the colour of an object, or represented
separately, but associated with the target item, such as a detail about
the room in which study took place. Some (e.g., Diana, Yonelinas, &
Ranganath, 2010; Staresina & Davachi, 2008) suggest that retrieval of
the former type of source (e.g., the colour of an object) might entail
different mechanisms/brain regions, such as pattern completion in
perirhinal cortex rather than hippocampus, than does retrieval of the
latter (e.g., an object’s location). Mayes, Montaldi, and Migo (2007),
for example, distinguished associations between information repre-
sented within the same brain region, and associations between types
of information represented in different brain regions. Here though,
we regard retrieval of any source information from episodic memory
as recollection, regardless whether that source is internal/external,
unitised/non-unitised, or within/between information-type.
There are at least two well-known caveats with the typical
source memory paradigm. The ﬁrst is the problem of guessing: If
there is only a small number of distinct source-types, and one is
interested in differences associated with correct versus incorrect
source decisions (e.g., in terms of reaction times, ERP amplitude, or
BOLD amplitude), then a signiﬁcant proportion of those decisions
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response option for guesses (e.g., Staresina & Davachi, 2008), though
more generally, one would obtain a concurrent conﬁdence judgment
associated with each source decision, which provides greater
latitude to separate recollection from conﬁdence (e.g., Mickes,
Wais, & Wixted, 2009; Slotnick, 2010).
A second caveat, particularly relevant to neuroimaging analyses
(see, e.g., Montaldi & Mayes, 2011), is that an incorrect source
decision does not imply that no recollection has occurred. This is
simply because, though a participant may not recall the type of
source targeted by the task (e.g., location of the item on a screen),
they might recall some other contextual detail. This issue of ‘‘non-
criterial recollection’’ (Yonelinas & Jacoby, 1996) has been well-
known for many years. However, what has been less often appre-
ciated is that, even when a source decision is correct (and not simply
a guess, e.g., given with high conﬁdence), this need not imply
recollection has occurred, as expanded below.
If one assumes separate semantic and episodic memory
systems, then a further problem with the source memory para-
digm arises if participants are able to generate associations of the
test item (from their semantic memory), and then match those
associations with each episodic trace (in their episodic memory).
Such a ‘‘generate-and-recognise’’ process (Watkins & Gardiner,
1979) would not correspond to recollection, in the present sense
of recall (retrieval of additional information) from episodic
memory. Rather, this retrieval from semantic memory, followed
by a global match with each trace in episodic memory, would
correspond to an assessment of familiarity.
This potential distinction is illustrated in Fig. 1. The ﬁrst
possibility, shown in the top panel, is that the cue provided by the
test item directly retrieves a speciﬁc trace from episodic memory,
which allows the source decision to be made, i.e., recollection. An
alternative possibility however, shown in the bottom panel, is that,
being aware that there are only two locations and two font colours,
the participant imagines the cue word either above or below a
ﬁxation cross (i.e., constructs a visual image based on their semantic
knowledge), and either in green or orange; i.e., generates up to four
images in this case. One of these images may then result in a
sufﬁcient match against the traces in episodic memory that a sense
of familiarity with that image is experienced, allowing the partici-
pant to effect a correct source decision. This process does not entail
recall of additional information from episodic memory, but might
correspond to a type of associative familiarity (Yonelinas, 1997).
This generate-and-recognise strategy is feasible if only a few
source options are probed in the experiment. This would appear
to relate to the concern of Montaldi and Mayes (2010), when they
note: ‘‘Participants may hold these two or three sources in their
minds throughout the task, so that success does not indicate
recollection (i.e., cued recall), but associative familiarity’’
(p. 1303). It is less clear however that ‘‘this problem can only be
effectively addressed by having unique item–source pairings with
adequate numbers of items’’ (Montaldi & Mayes, 2010, p. 1303).
Having unique item–source pairings would seem neither neces-
sary nor sufﬁcient. What would appear to matter is the number of
response options (source attributes) associated with each test
item: A small number of options (even if varied each trial) is
always going to invite participants to generate combinations of
the test item with each source option, and see if any combinations
seem familiar. In other words, the best way to avoid this problem
would be to have a large (open-ended) response set: i.e., require
recall of any of a large number of source attributes. Indeed, the
same problem of generate-and-recognise strategies applies to the
process dissociation procedure (Jacoby, 1991), when participants
must exclude test items on the basis of a single, speciﬁc source
attribute. It can also apply to associative recognition paradigms
(where the task is to distinguish intact from re-arranged pairingsof studied items; Yonelinas, 1997), if one item in each pair can be
generated from the other, e.g., if semantically related.
Of course, this hypothetical relationship between generate-
and-recognise strategies, familiarity and recollection makes cer-
tain assumptions (e.g., that distinct episodic and semantic mem-
ory systems exist), and is difﬁcult to test in practice. In Fig. 1, for
example, one can also imagine an intermediate case, where a
participant imagines the test word in its correct location at study
(but not in any speciﬁc colour), and this cue is sufﬁcient to
retrieve an episodic trace, now complete with the studied colour
too. This would be an example of partial recollection: Where part
of the source was generated from semantic memory (the loca-
tion), allowing retrieval of another aspect of source from episodic
memory (the colour). We return to this possibility when discuss-
ing our present data.1.1.2. The subtleties of the Remember/Know procedure
The Remember/Know (R/K) paradigm is often assumed to be a
direct way of assessing recollection and familiarity, simply by asking
participants to introspect on their recognition decision. The paradigm
was originally introduced by Tulving (1985), in an attempt to assess
whether retrieval has occurred from episodic or semantic memory
systems. According to Tulving, ‘‘remembering’’ reﬂects conscious
memory of oneself in the past (‘‘autonoetic’’ consciousness, or
‘‘mental time travel’’), while ‘‘knowing’’ reﬂects an experience asso-
ciated with the past in the absence of such self-memory (‘‘noetic’’
consciousness). Since then, numerous dissociations between R/K
judgments as a function of various experimental manipulations have
been reported (see Gardiner, Ramponi, & Richardson-Klavehn, 2002,
for review), and these have been interpreted in various ways
(e.g., Gardiner & Parkin, 1990; Rajaram, 1993; Jacoby et al., 1997),
the most popular of which is in terms of independent processes of
recollection and familiarity (Yonelinas & Jacoby, 1995). Nonetheless,
the relationship between the empirical labels of R and K and the
underlying hypothetical constructs of recollection and familiarity –
for example, whether that relationship is exclusive, independent or
redundant – remains a matter of debate (e.g., Knowlton & Squire,
1995), as recently reviewed by Mayes et al. (2007). Furthermore,
others have argued that the empirical dissociations between R/K
judgments can be explained more simply in terms of signal-detection
theory (SDT), as different response criteria placed on a single
continuum of memory evidence (e.g., Donaldson, 1996; though
multiple, qualitatively different contributions to that evidence are
not ruled out by a unidimensional SDT model of the decision itself;
Wixted & Mickes, 2010; and there are also multidimensional SDT
approaches, e.g., Rotello, Macmillan, & Reeder, 2004).
Despite these unresolved issues, and the attractiveness of the
alternative source memory paradigm in providing an objective
rather than purely subjective measure, we have preferred the R/K
paradigm, mostly because of the other difﬁculties with the source
memory paradigm raised in the previous section. Foremost, by not
being restricted to a speciﬁc source attribute, R judgments should be
an exhaustive measure of recollection (cf. non-criterial recollection
in source memory paradigms). Furthermore, by not focusing the
participant on a speciﬁc type of source, it would seem less likely that
participants will spontaneously adopt a generate-and-recognise
strategy (e.g., based on what they expect to be the common types
of source). In other words, they are less likely to adopt a speciﬁc
retrieval orientation (Rugg & Wilding, 2000). Indeed, such strategies
are further discouraged in the ‘‘modiﬁed R/K’’ procedure developed
by Mayes, Montaldi and colleagues (Mayes et al., 2007), in which
attempts to recollect are discouraged, such that R judgments are
reserved only for incidental recollections.
However, the above argument about exhaustiveness of
R judgments is, of course, predicated on the participant fully
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bering’’—viz, retrieving at least one bit of information that is not
present at Test, nor generated from some other source such as
semantic memory. Foremost, this assumes that participants can
tell whether additional information that comes to mind has come
from their episodic memory, rather than from, say, semantic
memory (Tulving, 1983). One simple solution is to assume that
information retrieved from episodic memory contains a unique
episodic ‘‘tag’’ (e.g., some unique spatiotemporal contextual
information). Another possibility however relates to the unex-
pected (and/or unintended) nature or ﬂuency of that retrieval; an
issue to which we return in the General Discussion in terms of
attributing the ease of retrieval to recollection.
Furthermore, in practice, participants may experience some
trials when they retrieve many contextual details, and other trials
in which they only retrieve one, and hence decide to impose their
own criterion for giving an R judgment. Indeed, this can be
modelled by assuming the amount of recollected information
represents a continuum (Rotello et al., 2004; Wixted & Mickes,
2010). In this case, an absence of an R judgment does not mean
that no recollection occurred (again, with implications for any
concurrent neuroimaging data). However, this emphasises the
importance of the R/K instructions given to participants: We
would emphasise that retrieval of just one contextual detail is
sufﬁcient to justify an R judgment, even if this would mean that
participants are less conﬁdent of some R judgments than others
(when multiple details are retrieved).
The importance of precise R/K instructions is further reinforced
by demonstrations that different results are obtained depending
on: (i) whether R/K instructions do, or do not, emphasise that
remembering and knowing are not the same as high and low
conﬁdence (Geraci, McCabe, & Guillory, 2009); (ii) whether an
additional ‘‘guess’’ option is included (Gardiner et al., 2002);
(iii) whether R/K judgments are made after the initial old–new
judgment (a two-step procedure), or concurrently (in a R/K/new,
one-step procedure; Hicks & Marsh, 1999); (iv) as a function of the
speciﬁc response labels used (e.g., McCabe & Geraci, 2009, who
found more accurate use of these concepts when they were
labelled ‘‘type A memory’’ and ‘‘type B memory’’, to avoid collo-
quial meanings associated with ‘‘remember’’ and ‘‘know’’); and
(v) whether exclusive or parallel R/K ratings are used (Higham &
Vokey, 2004). In the experiments below, we address most of these
concerns, using a two-step procedure, with instructions based on
Rajaram (1993) that emphasise the difference between remember-
ing, knowing, and conﬁdence, and use the term ‘‘familiar’’ rather
than ‘‘know’’, to minimise colloquial biases associated with ‘‘know-
ing’’ (though we retain the labels ‘‘R’’ and ‘‘K’’ here for consistency
with the literature). Even if these precautions are insufﬁcient
(e.g., if interpretation of ‘‘familiar’’ suffers from the opposite problem
as ‘‘knowing’’, in suggesting lower conﬁdence), the cross-over dis-
sociation that we ﬁnd between R/K judgments and type of masked
prime would seem difﬁcult to explain solely in terms of a conﬂation
with conﬁdence/guessing. However, the use of parallel rather than
exclusive ratings of R and K (e.g., Brown & Bodner, 2011; Kurilla &
Westerman, 2008), in terms of the implications for participants’
interpretation of recollection and familiarity, is an important issue
to which we return in the Discussion to Experiment 1.
1.2. A new dissociation in Remember/Know judgments produced
by masked primes at test
Having reviewed the pros and cons of common methods to
assess recollection within the recognition memory paradigm, we
turn now to the speciﬁc background associated with the present
experiments. One variant of the recognition memory paradigm
that has been used to support dissociable contributions fromrecollection and familiarity was originally introduced by Jacoby
and Whitehouse (1989). In this variant, each test item is preceded
by a brief, masked prime, which either does, or does not, match
the test item (e.g., is either the same or a different word). When
participants were not aware of the prime, Jacoby and Whitehouse
found participants were more likely to report the test item as
studied when it was preceded by a matching than non-matching
prime, regardless of whether or not the test item was in fact
studied. The authors attributed this ‘‘memory illusion’’ to an
increased ﬂuency of processing test items that were preceded
by matching primes: In the absence of awareness for the true
source of that ﬂuency (i.e., the primes), they proposed that
participants erroneously attribute that ﬂuency to prior processing
in the study phase. This explanation sits easily with a dual-
process interpretation that masked primes affect familiarity,
rather than recollection. Indeed, a subsequent study by Rajaram
(1993) used the ‘‘standard’’ R/K procedure, and conﬁrmed that the
masked repetition primes increased K judgments (to both studied
and unstudied items), but not R judgments (see also Woollams,
Taylor, Karayanidis, & Henson, 2008; though see Lucas, Taylor,
Henson, & Paller, this issue; Tunney & Fernie, 2007).
This effect of repetition priming on familiarity is often inter-
preted as due to perceptual ﬂuency. However, because two identical
words (in different case) are similar in terms of perceptual features,
and identical lexically and conceptually, it is unclear whether the
locus of the effect is truly perceptual. A study by Rajaram and Geraci
(2000) used semantic primes, and found the same priming-related
increase in K but not R judgments that has been found using
repetition primes. This result suggests that the familiarity signal
arises at the level of conceptual ﬂuency (consistent with Yonelinas,
2002). However, because Rajaram and Geraci’s primes were also
associatively related to the test (target) item, it is possible that any
increase in familiarity was due to lexical rather than conceptual
ﬂuency: Although many associated words are also conceptually
related, associative probability is inﬂuenced by non-conceptual
factors such as the probability of co-occurrence in language (e.g.,
hobby-HORSE, grand-PIANO), and in semantic priming studies,
association tends to dominate over conceptual relatedness (Lucas,
2000). Furthermore, the primes in Rajarm and Geraci’s procedure
were unmasked (clearly visible), which has previously been found to
eliminate, or even reverse, repetition priming effects on recognition
memory (e.g., Jacoby & Whitehouse, 1989; see also Higham &
Vokey, 2004; Klinger, 2001).
In the following experiments, we attempted to isolate the
effect of conceptual ﬂuency on Remember/Know judgments by
using primes that shared semantic attributes, but were not
associatively related to the test cue (e.g., cow–HORSE; guitar–
PIANO), and which were sandwich masked to reduce participant’s
awareness of them. In Experiment 1, the effects of these masked,
conceptual primes on recognition decisions to a subsequent
target word were compared with those of repetition primes
(in relation to unprimed trials, where the prime word was
unrelated to the target word). In Experiments 2a and 2b, we
explored the effects of these conceptual primes without concur-
rent exposure to repetition primes.2. Experiment 1
2.1. Materials and methods
2.1.1. Participants
Participants were recruited from the student population of
Cambridge University; all participants had normal or corrected to
normal vision and were right-handed (self-report). Experiments
were of the type approved by a local research ethics committee
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(12 females) gave informed consent to participate, with a mean
age of 20 (SD¼2) years.2.1.2. Materials
The stimuli consisted of 480 word-pairs (‘‘prime’’–‘‘TARGET’’) that
were conceptually related but not lexically associated according to
word-generation norms (both forward and backward association
probabilities o.10 in the USF norms; Nelson, McEvoy, & Schreiber,
1998). Conceptual relatedness was deﬁned on the basis of taxonomic
category (e.g., piano–GUITAR, horse–COW), attributes or functions
(e.g., silver-COIN, teapot-BOIL), typical context (e.g., pond-FROG,
wedding-BRIDE), part–whole relationship (e.g., tobacco-CIGAR, cam-
era-LENS), or lexical interchangeability (e.g., biscuit-COOKIE, shop-
BOUTIQUE). All primes and targets were between 3 and 8 letters long
(primes: M¼5.26, SD¼1.12; targets M¼5.44, SD¼1.38) and had
written frequencies between 1 and 150 per million (primes:
M¼33.97, SD¼26.00; targets M¼34.14, SD¼36.08; Kucera &
Francis, 1967). These conceptually related prime–target pairs com-
prised the Primed condition in Conceptual Priming blocks; two
further lists were created by re-pairing each target with itself (Primed
condition, Repetition Priming blocks) or with an unrelated prime via a
pseudo-random shufﬂe (Unprimed conditions in both Conceptual and
Repetition Priming blocks). These lists were each further sub-divided
into four Sets (A–D) for the counterbalancing described below.2.1.3. Procedure
The experiment consisted of four cycles of Study-Test blocks.
During each Study block (60 trialsþ4 ‘‘dummy’’ trials, 2 at the
beginning and 2 at the end, to prevent primacy and recency effects,
ignored in analysis; approximately 2.5 min), participants performed
an ‘‘interestingness’’ judgment (based on our previous studies,
e.g., Taylor, Buratto, & Henson, in press; Woollams et al., 2008):
They read each word and indicated whether it was interesting or not
by pressing one of two buttons. During each Test phase (120
trialsþ2 ‘‘practice’’ trials at beginning, ignored in analysis; approxi-
mately 10 min), participants performed a yes/no recognition task, in
which they ﬁrst indicated whether they thought each test item had+
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Fig. 2. Schematic of trial procedure at Test, and examples of each of the three types o
square brackets (note that spacing of objects on the timeline does not reﬂect duration(old) or had not (new) appeared in the previous Study phase. If they
responded ‘‘old’’, they were also prompted to decide whether they
remembered seeing the test item (‘‘R’’ judgment) or whether the item
was familiar (‘‘K’’ judgment). Note that we used the label ‘‘familiar’’,
rather than the traditional ‘‘know’’ judgment, for reasons given in
Section 1.1.2. Participants were trained in this distinction using
instructions based on Rajaram (1993; see Taylor et al., in press) and
prior training (16 practice test trials). If the participant responded
‘‘new’’ to the test cue, or if they failed to respond (time limit-
¼2000 ms), the procedure continued to the next trial (on the rare
occasions where no response was given, a ‘‘new’’ response was
assumed).
On Test trials, the test item (‘‘target’’) was preceded by a brief,
masked prime word (see Fig. 2 for trial timing). In Conceptual
Priming blocks (either the ﬁrst two or last two Test phases; order
counterbalanced across participants), prime–target pairs were
either conceptually related (Primed trials, 50%¼60 trials/block)
or unrelated (Unprimed trials, 50%); in Repetition Priming blocks,
prime–target pairs were either the same word (Primed trials, 50%)
or unrelated words (Unprimed, 50%). Primes were presented in
lower case and targets in upper case, to minimise visual overlap
on Repetition priming trials. No word was repeated across blocks.
Block Order (Repetition/Conceptual Priming ﬁrst) and Set-
Condition mapping (A/B/C/D-Repetition/Conceptual Primed/
Unprimed) were counterbalanced across participants, with a total
cycle of eight participants. Stimuli were presented on an LCD
computer screen (60 Hz refresh rate) positioned approximately
70 cm in front of the participant. Words were presented in white
on a black background. Responses were made with right and left
index ﬁngers, with response mappings counterbalanced sepa-
rately across Interestingness, Old/New, and R/K decisions. Stimu-
lus presentation and response collection was performed using
E-Prime 1.0 (Psychology Software Tools).
Upon completion of the main experiment, subjective and
objective measures of prime awareness/visibility were collected.
First, participants were asked whether they noticed any ‘‘hidden
words’’ (i.e., the masked primes) in the procedure, and whether
they had been able to identify any of these words (subjective
measures). The nature of the experiment, and in particular of the50 msec]
Test Cue [300 msec]
Remember 
or
Familiar?
R/K Prompt  [until response]
Old/New Response Interval [2000 msec]
R/K Response 
Interval [2000 msec]
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).
Table 1
Mean percentage of responses in Experiment 1 (with min–max range in brackets) to Studied or Unstudied words that were given each type of Memory Judgement (R, K,
New) for each Prime Type (Conceptual/Repetition) and Prime Status (Primed/Unprimed), out of 60.
Memory judgement Repetition primes Conceptual primes
Studied Unstudied Studied Unstudied
Primed Unprimed Primed Unprimed Primed Unprimed Primed Unprimed
R 58.1 (17–88) 60.6 (12–90) .6 (0–3) .5 (0–3) 59.6 (28–90) 55.1 (6–83) .5 (0–3) .5 (0–3)
K 25.5 (3–53) 20.5 (0–50) 9.8 (0–28) 5.7 (0–22) 24.1 (1–52) 24.2 (5–47) 5.4 (0–18) 6.9 (0–30)
New 16.4 (3–48) 18.8 (5–50) 89.6 (68–100) 93.8 (78–100) 16.3 (0–43) 20.7 (3–50) 94.2 (82–100) 92.6 (70–100)
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Fig. 3. Priming (% of trials called ‘‘old’’ for Primed–Unprimed) as a function of
Studied (Hits; upper panel) or Unstudied (False Alarms; lower panel) items, for
Conceptual vs. Repetition Primes and R (red) vs. K (green) judgments in Experi-
ment 1. The two bars for K judgments are based on raw numbers (dark green) or
under independent (IRK) scoring (‘iK’, light green; see main text). Error bars are
95% conﬁdence intervals.
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Prime Visibility Test. In this test, 120 test trials were shown as
during the experiment (ﬁxation, forward mask, prime, backward
mask, test cue), and participants were asked to indicate which of
three (equally likely to be correct across trials) candidate words
had been the prime on that trial (i.e., 3AFC). The three candidate
primes were (a) the same word as the target (i.e., a Repetition
prime), (b) a conceptually related word (i.e., a Conceptual prime),
and (c) an unrelated word (Unprimed condition). Participants
were instructed to guess if they were unsure, and the next trial
began only after a response was made.
2.1.4. Data analyses
The data (proportion of trials and, separately, response times)
were analysed in multifactorial repeated-measures analysis of
variance (ANOVA). Of particular interest were effects involving
the Prime Status factor, i.e., priming effects; effects not involving
Prime Status are reported only when relevant. Signiﬁcant effects
are only reported in the absence of signiﬁcant higher-order
interactions. All statistical tests had alpha set at .05, and a
Greenhouse–Geisser correction was applied to all F-values with
more than one degree of freedom in the numerator. T-tests were
two-tailed, except where stated otherwise.
2.2. Results
2.2.1. Proportion of trials
The mean proportions of responses in each condition are shown
in Table 1. For R judgments, overall accuracy (Pr, the proportion of
Hits minus the proportion of False Alarms, averaged across primed vs.
unprimed) was .57 in Conceptual Priming and .59 in Repetition
Priming blocks, both signiﬁcantly greater than zero, t(25)s410.0,
pso.001. For K judgments, familiarity was calculated under inde-
pendence assumptions (‘‘IRK’’ procedure; Yonelinas & Jacoby, 1995),
where familiarity¼K/(NR); R¼number of R judgments; K¼number
of K judgments and N¼total number of test trials (non-independent
scores are reported in footnotes below). Familiarity Pr values were
then .52 in Conceptual Priming and .49 in Repetition Priming blocks,
both of which were signiﬁcantly greater than zero, t(25)s410.0,
pso.001.3
For factorial ANOVA analyses, separate recollection and famil-
iarity IRK estimates were made for studied (i.e., hits) and unstudied
(i.e., correct rejection) trials, and for each priming condition. For
‘‘old’’ judgments, the 2 (Priming Type)2 (Memory Judgment)2
(Study Status)2 (Prime Status) ANOVA revealed a signiﬁcant3 Under non-independence scoring (raw numbers of K judgments), these Pr
values were .18 in Conceptual Priming and .15 in Repetition Priming blocks, both
of which were again signiﬁcantly greater than zero, t(25)s45.0, pso .001. The
same ANOVA model reported in the main text but using raw K judgments also
produced a 3-way interaction between Priming Type, Memory Judgement, and
Prime Status, F(1,25)¼6.59, po .05, and an additional 3-way interaction between
Priming Type, Study Status, and Prime Status, F(1,25)¼12.9, p¼ .001.3-way interaction between Priming TypeMemory Judgment
Prime Status, F(1,25)¼7.87, po .01, which indicated that the pattern
of R- and K-priming effects differed between Conceptual and
Repetition Priming blocks. The nature of this interaction is apparent
in Fig. 3, which shows Priming Scores (Primed–Unprimed) as a
function of R/K judgment and Priming Type, separately for Hits
(Studied words) and False Alarms (Unstudied words; error bars are
95% conﬁdence intervals; raw and ‘‘independence’’ K shown sepa-
rately). Conceptual priming caused a signiﬁcant increase in R (but
not K) judgments; Repetition priming, on the other hand, caused a
signiﬁcant increase in K (but not R) judgments.
Even though no interaction involving Study Status and Prime
Status reached signiﬁcance under IRK scoring (unlike exclusive
scoring, under which the Priming Type Study StatusPrime
Status was signiﬁcant; see footnote 3), the conﬁdence intervals in
Fig. 3 show that the Conceptual priming effect on R was only
Table 2
Mean of median RT in Experiment 1 (with standard deviation in brackets) to Studied or Unstudied words that were given each type of Memory Judgement (R, K, New) for
each for each Prime Type (Conceptual/Repetition) and Prime Status (Primed/Unprimed). Note:¼ insufﬁcient numbers to estimate RT (see Table 1).
Memory judgement Repetition primes Conceptual primes
Studied Unstudied Studied Unstudied
Primed Unprimed Primed Unprimed Primed Unprimed Primed Unprimed
R 805 (128) 843 (87) – – 837 (106) 857 (94) – –
K 983 (183) 1066 (193) – – 991 (159) 1006 (140) – –
New – – 873 (124) 837 (110) – – 851 (120) 868 (134)
4 The pattern of results was the same when raw K judgments (non-indepen-
dence assumptions) were used: Priming TypeMemory JudgmentPrime Status
interaction, F(1,46)¼11.9, po .001; Priming Type Study StatusPrime Status
interaction, F(1,46)¼31.2, po .001; interactions with awareness interactions:
Fso1.48, ps4 .23.
5 The pattern of results was the same under non-independence assumptions:
For Unaware participants, Priming TypeMemory Judgment Prime Status
F(1,22)¼4.76, po .05; Priming Type Study StatusPrime Status, F(1,22)¼18.1,
po .001.
6 For example, even the n¼23 subjectively ‘‘unaware’’ participants performed
above chance on the objective prime visibility test (M¼61%, SD¼26%, t(22)¼5.10,
po .001), demonstrating that the ability to see the primes when alerted to their
presence (in an objective test) is not necessarily a good indicator of self-reported
awareness during the experiment itself.
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ing effect on K occurred for both Studied and Unstudied items
(False Alarms).
2.3. Response time
Response times (RTs; medians) for correct ‘‘old’’ (Hit) and
‘‘new’’ (CR) decisions (there were too few False Alarms and Misses
to include these), shown in Table 2, were analysed in a 232
ANOVA with factors Priming Type (Conceptual, Repetition),
Memory Judgment (R, K, CR), and Prime Status (Primed,
Unprimed). Two participants were excluded because they had
insufﬁcient number of trials (o2) in at least one cell of the
design.
The ANOVA revealed a main effect of Memory Judgment,
F(1.88,43.3)¼38.8, po .001, and follow-up t-tests showed that RTs
to correct ‘‘old’’ decisions subsequently given an R judgment
(M¼836 ms, SD¼93) were signiﬁcantly faster than those subse-
quently given a K judgment (M¼1012 ms, SD¼138), t(23)¼9.28,
po .001. CRs were also faster than Ks, t(23)¼6.85, po .001; R and
CR RTs did not differ (p4 .1). A main effect of Prime Status was also
found, F(1,23)¼5.55, po .05, indicating that participants were faster
to respond in the Primed (M¼890 ms, SD¼104) than in the
Unprimed condition (M¼913 ms, SD¼98). Additionally, the inter-
action between Memory Judgment and Prime Status was signiﬁcant,
F(1.62,37.2)¼6.53, po .01; follow-up t-tests showed that the prim-
ing effect (Unprimed–Primed, collapsed across Conceptual and
Repetition blocks) was signiﬁcantly larger for R (M¼29 ms) than
for CR (M¼9 ms), t(24)¼3.24, po .01, and signiﬁcantly larger for
K (M¼48 ms) than for CR, t(23)¼3.09, po .01.
2.4. Prime visibility test
In our subjective test of prime visibility, 16 of the 26 participants
(62%) reported being aware that there were ‘‘hidden’’ words in the
experiment; 6 of these ‘‘aware’’ participants reported being able to
identify prime words on some trials. In our objective test of prime
visibility, overall accuracy was 68.2% (SD¼24.0%), which was
signiﬁcantly better than chance (33%), t(25)¼7.46, po .001. Though
mean accuracy was greatest for Conceptual primes (M¼74.7%,
SD¼26.0%), intermediate for Repetition Primes (M¼67.2%, SD¼
33.6%) and least for Unrelated primes (M¼62.6%, SD¼32.4%), there
was no signiﬁcant effect of Prime Type in a one-way ANOVA,
F(1.60,40.1)¼1.76, p¼ .19.
Given that awareness of the primes might have affected the
present results – e.g., the increased tendency to give R judgments
following conceptual primes – we repeated the above ANOVA on
proportions of ‘‘old’’ judgments, but with an additional between-
participant factor of aware vs. unaware. To increase the power of
this analysis, we added data from the 22 participants who
performed the identical paradigm within an fMRI scanner
(reported in Taylor et al., in press), of whom 9 reported awareness
(resulting in n¼25 in the ‘‘aware’’ group, and n¼23 in the‘‘unaware’’ group). The three-way interactions of Priming Type-
Memory Judgment Prime Status, F(1,46)¼7.1, po .05, and of
Priming Type Study Status Prime Status, F(1,46)¼8.7, po .01,
remained the highest order signiﬁcant interactions, as in the
previous analysis.4 Importantly, the group factor of Awareness did
not interact with either of these effects, Fso2.2, ps4 .14, or indeed
any other effect, Fso2.52, ps4 .11. Furthermore, when the main
ANOVA was performed on the n¼23 ‘‘unaware’’ participants only,
the same three-way interactions of Priming TypeMemory Judg-
mentPrime Status, F(1,22)¼5.5, po .05, and of Priming Type-
 Study Status Prime Status, F(1,22)¼5.8, po .05, remained the
highest order signiﬁcant interactions, as in the previous analyses.5
Indeed, the pattern of signiﬁcant priming effects matched that from
all participants from Experiment 1: being signiﬁcant only for R Hits
following conceptual primes, and K False Alarms following repeti-
tion primes, though no longer quite reached signiﬁcance for K Hits
following repetition primes (Fig. 4).
Finally, given possible limitations in our subjective measure of
prime awareness (e.g., in reluctance or incompleteness of some
participants’ self-report6), we also looked for correlations across all
N¼48 participants between their amount of priming and their
objective prime visibility accuracy. There was no sign of a positive
correlation for Conceptual primes followed by R judgments (r¼ .22,
p¼ .12, even if restricted to R Hits, r¼ .23, p¼ .11), or followed by K
judgments (r¼ .16, p¼ .12, even if restricted to K FAs, r¼ .01,
p¼ .94; also non-signiﬁcant for raw K judgments); nor for Repetition
primes followed by R judgments (r¼ .03, p¼ .81, even if restricted
to R Hits, r¼ .02, p¼ .87), or followed by K judgments (r¼ .03,
p¼ .39, even if restricted to K FAs, r¼ .01, p¼ .97; also non-signiﬁcant
for raw K judgments). Thus we found no evidence that the present
pattern of priming effects, particularly the interaction between
Conceptual vs. Repetition primes and R vs. K judgments, was affected
by how likely the participants were to have seen the primes.3. Discussion
The main ﬁnding of Experiment 1 was the surprising cross-
over interaction between Prime Type (Conceptual vs. Repetition)
and Memory Judgment (R vs. K) on the priming effect (difference
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Fig. 4. Priming effects for participants who reported being unaware of primes,
combining data from Experiment 1 with data from a different group of partici-
pants reported in Taylor et al. (in press). Priming (% of trials called ‘‘old’’ for
Primed–Unprimed) is shown as a function of Studied (Hits; upper panel) or
Unstudied (False Alarms; lower panel) items, for Conceptual vs. Repetition Primes
and R (red) vs. K (green) judgments in Experiment 1. The two bars for K judgments
are based on raw numbers (dark green) or under independent (IRK) scoring
(‘iK’, light green; see main text). Error bars are 95% conﬁdence intervals.
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items in a recognition memory task): While Repetition primes
increased K but not R judgments, replicating several previous
studies (e.g., Rajaram, 1993; Woollams et al., 2008), Conceptual
primes increased R but not K judgments. The latter ﬁnding for
Conceptual primes would seem incompatible with previous
accounts of masked priming of recognition test items, i.e., in
terms of an increased ﬂuency of processing test items being
erroneously attributed to the past (Jacoby & Whitehouse, 1989),
since this would seem to align more closely with the concepts of
familiarity and K judgments, rather than the concepts of recollec-
tion and R judgments.
The pattern of Conceptual and Repetition priming effects was
also different for Hits and False Alarms: Repetition priming
increased K-Hits and K-FAs, whereas Conceptual priming
increased R-Hits only. The same pattern was found in Taylor
et al. (in press). This is further evidence that Conceptual and
Repetition primes had qualitatively different effects (for example,
in signal-detection terms, Conceptual primes may increase dis-
criminability, i.e., shift only the distribution of studied items,
whereas Repetition primes may affect response criterion, e.g., by
shifting both studied and unstudied distributions with respect to
the criterion). The selective increase of correct R responses caused
by Conceptual priming is also difﬁcult to reconcile with a ﬂuency-
attribution framework, which would predict increased ‘‘old’’responses for more ﬂuent (primed) items irrespective of Study
Status (hence the label ‘‘memory illusion’’).
These priming effects in terms of increases in the proportion of
‘‘old’’ judgments were mirrored by decreases in RTs, at least for
Studied items. Decreased RTs following priming are expected if
ﬂuent processing induced by a matching prime affects the
recognition judgment, i.e., speeding up ‘‘old’’ judgments to stu-
died items, but slowing down ‘‘new’’ judgments to unstudied
items (though the latter was not signiﬁcant here; see also Taylor
et al., in press). Although the same interactions with Prime Type
(Conceptual vs. Repetition) were not found in RTs, as they were
found in proportions of ‘‘old’’ judgments, the general pattern of
RTs suggested that there was no obvious speed-accuracy trade-off
entailed, at least for studied items.
We found no evidence that the interaction between Concep-
tual versus Repetition Primes and R versus K judgments differed
according to either subjective or objective measures of partici-
pants’ ability to see the masked primes (even though the latter
was above chance). While the critical factor(s) in masked priming
of recognition test items remains unresolved – e.g., whether it is
awareness (Jacoby & Whitehouse, 1989), attention (Klinger,
2001), a perceptual heuristic (Higham & Vokey, 2000) or prime
duration (Huber, Clark, Curran, & Winkielman, 2008) – the
present prime visibility analyses suggest at least that participants
were not using explicit knowledge of the two different types of
primes to guide their R/K judgments (e.g., in a strategic manner).
How might the increased incidence of R judgments to studied
items following conceptual primes be explained? Given evidence
that semantically related concepts can be ‘‘activated’’ even when
a prime is subliminal (Van den Bussche, Van den Noortgate, &
Reynvoet, 2009), the ‘‘coming to mind’’ of such concepts (in the
absence of knowledge of the source of that coming to mind)
might be sufﬁcient lead to an R judgment. If this were the sole
cause however, then an increase in R judgements (following
related vs. unrelated conceptual primes) would also be expected
for unstudied items. To explain why the increase in R judgments
occurred only for studied items, there must be some interaction
between the (subliminal) activation of the prime concept and the
memory trace laid down at Study. Given that the Study task
entailed reasonably deep, elaborative processing (in order to
judge a word’s ‘‘interestingness’’), it is likely that the concept
denoted by the Conceptual prime at test was one of the concepts
generated at study, at least on some trials, and therefore incor-
porated into an episodic trace. The combined activation of both
the target and the prime at Test may therefore have increased the
match with such episodic traces, relative to the unrelated
(unprimed) case. According to the proposal in the Introduction
however, such an increased ‘‘match’’ signal would be experienced
as familiarity rather than recollection, so should increase K rather
than R judgments. Therefore our preferred interpretation is that
the activation of prime and target at Test actually increases the
probability of retrieval of the complete episodic trace (i.e.,
combine to function as a more effective retrieval cue). This
retrieval would then include additional information from the
Study phase (such as other semantically-related concepts, or even
some unique spatiotemporal tag), which deﬁnes recollection, and
hence prompts the participant to give an R judgment. This ‘‘partial
recollection’’ hypothesis is illustrated in Fig. 5. This hypothesis
can also explain why, when we replicated this conceptual priming
effect in an fMRI study (Taylor et al., in press), we found
correlations across participants between the size of their con-
ceptual priming effect on R judgments, and the size of the neural
response in brain regions previously associated with recollection.
The increase in K judgments following Repetition primes, on
the other hand, might be explained by a global match signal,
in which the ‘‘faster’’ or ‘‘stronger’’ activation of the test item
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Fig. 5. Schematic of how Conceptual primes might increase likelihood of direct episodic retrieval (recollection)—i.e., partial recollection of other information (internal
source) generated at study, such as ‘‘Hen’’ (see text for further explanation).
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may not increase the probability of retrieving an episodic trace
however, resulting in a lack of additional contextual information,
and hence a K judgment. Though the match signal will be lower on
average for Unstudied than Studied items, the increase following
repetition primes will still produce occasions where the signal is
strong enough to surpass the criterion for a K judgment, and
produce a false alarm (e.g., in signal-detection terms, both old and
new distributions would be shifted to the right relative to the K
response criterion)—i.e., such an effect of Repetition primes would
increase K judgments to both studied and unstudied items (unlike
for Conceptual primes).
We do not know at what stage in word processing the repetition
primes might boost activation (i.e., it could arise at one or more
orthographic, phonological, lexical or even semantic stages). This then
raises the question of why the semantic overlap entailed by repetition
primes does not also increase the probability of retrieving an episodic
trace in the manner described above for Conceptual primes. One
possibility is that it is only the presence of additional, alternative
concepts (activated by a conceptual but not repetition prime) that
increases the probability of retrieving an episodic trace. One way to
test this hypothesis might be to switch to a paired-associative cued-
recall paradigm, in which unrelated pairs of words are studied, and
then the single word used as the cue at test could be preceded by a
third, masked prime word that was either semantically related or
unrelated to the studied associate. If this conceptual prime increased
the probability of recalling the associate, then this would be an
objective indication of recollection (without requiring a subjective R
judgment), which could not be explained by a generate-and-recog-
nise strategy, given that the cue (test item) was unrelated, and thatthe prime, though related, is unlikely to be used in a conscious
generation process (assuming that it was not consciously perceived).
Before switching to other paradigms like cued recall, however,
we are faced with the puzzle that an increase in R judgments
following semantically related primes was not found by Rajaram
and Geraci (2000), who found an increase in K judgments instead,
i.e., the same as when using repetition primes. One reason for this
discrepancy may relate to the fact that their primes were also
associatively related, rather than purely semantically related. This
may have induced a different type of ﬂuency (e.g., lexical), or may
have partially activated associates at test that were different from
those generated during the (semantic) study task (which may
interact further with differences in the two study tasks: interest-
ingness judgments in the present case versus intentional memor-
isation in Rajaram & Geraci, 2000). A related potential explanation
comes from the deﬁnition of association, i.e., when one word is
read, the other is likely to come to mind. On test trials with
associative primes, participants may feel that the test cue made
the prime word ‘‘come to mind’’, which is not an unusual
experience (by deﬁnition), and perhaps even an expected one,
and therefore would not differentiate the Study episode from
other prior experiences with the test cue. By contrast, on test
trials with conceptually related (but non-associated) primes, the
experience of the target bringing the prime to mind would (by
deﬁnition) be a low-probability experience, and would therefore
be diagnostic of the Study episode.
Another possible reason for the discrepancy across studies is
that Rajaram and Geraci used unmasked primes (150 ms dura-
tion, followed by a 100 ms gap before the test item), which may
affect, for example, how participants attribute ﬂuency (Jacoby
Table 3
Mean percentage of responses in Experiments 2a and 2b (with min–max range in brackets) to Studied or Unstudied words that were given each type of Memory Judgement
(R, K, New) for each Prime Status (Primed/Unprimed), out of 120.
Memory judgement Experiment 2a (Conceptual) Experiment 2b (conceptual)
Studied Unstudied Studied Unstudied
Primed Unprimed Primed Unprimed Primed Unprimed Primed Unprimed
R 61.1 (27–91) 59.8 (22–90) 1.0 (0–6) 1.0 (0–7) 54.1 (14–96) 54.4 (13–91) .8 (0–5) .5 (0–3)
K 17.9 (3–33) 17.3 (0–33) 7.8 (1–30) 8.8 (0–29) 18.2 (0–42) 18.7 (2–48) 6.3 (0–21) 5.7 (0–21)
New 20.9 (6–63) 22.7 (2–67) 91.2 (64–99) 90.2 (64–100) 27.8 (2–86) 27.0 (3–85) 93.0 (78–99) 93.9 (79–100)
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(Higham & Vokey, 2004; Klinger, 2001). As with the ‘deﬁnition of
association’ argument above, the visibility of unmasked primes
might allow participants to dismiss any retrieval of other associa-
tions also generated at Study as being due to the visible prime,
and not diagnostic of memory for the Study episode. Yet the item-
related ﬂuency induced by such visible, associatively related
primes may be more subtle and so less likely to be dismissed,
and hence interpreted as familiarity, resulting in the increase in
K responses found by Rajaram and Geraci.
Interestingly, two other recent studies have found priming
effects on R responses: Kurilla and Westerman (2008) and Brown
and Bodner (2011). They replicated the ﬁnding that masked
repetition primes only affect K judgments under the standard
(exclusive) R/K procedure, but found that they affected both R and
K ratings when using the parallel ratings procedure of Higham
and Vokey (2004), where a rating of 1–4 is made for both
Remembering and Knowing of each test item. Whether parallel
R/K ratings are justiﬁed theoretically, in terms of recollection and
familiarity, depends on whether or not one regards these pro-
cesses as mutually exclusive: If one can only ever recollect or
experience familiarity (but not both; e.g., Gardiner & Parkin,
1990), then parallel R/K ratings might be difﬁcult for participants
to interpret; if on the other hand recollection and familiarity can
co-occur (e.g., are either redundant or independent), then parallel
R/K ratings would appear to provide a more direct measure than
the traditional single judgment (e.g., in not requiring an adjust-
ment of K proportions by R proportions to estimate familiarity,
Yonelinas & Jacoby, 1995).
In the present context though, we consider a related but different
possibility: That forcing participants to use only one of two response
categories (in the standard R/K procedure) might obscure the
underlying causes, to the extent that dissociations between R/K
judgments that result may have little to do with recollection or
familiarity. Participants in Rajaram and Geraci’s study only experi-
enced semantically related primes, whereas participants in Experi-
ment 1 (and its replication in Taylor et al., in press) were exposed to
both conceptual primes and repetition primes. Thus, even if parti-
cipants were not aware of the primes (or at least, not aware of the
two types of prime), they may have experienced qualitatively
different effects of each type of prime, which they may have
expressed differentially through R vs. K judgments. Therefore in
Experiment 2a and 2b, we repeated the same basic procedure as
Experiment 1, but using only conceptual primes.7 For non-independence K, Pr¼ .09, which was signiﬁcantly greater than zero:
t(23)¼4.9, po .001. The main ANOVA on proportion of responses revealed
signiﬁcant main effects of Memory Judgment and of Study Status, and a signiﬁcant
interaction between Memory Judgment and Study Status, F(1,23)s456.8,
pso .001; but as in the independence-K analysis, no effects involving Prime Status
were signiﬁcant.4. Experiments 2a and 2b
Experiments 2a and 2b were two attempts to replicate the
effect of conceptual primes on R judgments that was found in
Experiment 1 (and in Taylor et al., in press), but without usingrepetition primes in the same experiment. Experiments 2a and 2b
were identical, differing only in the participants tested.
4.1. Materials and methods
4.1.1. Participants
Participants met the same criteria as Experiment 1. In Experi-
ment 2a, a total of 25 participants (11 females) were recruited
from the University of Cambridge, with a mean age of 21 (SD¼2)
years. In Experiment 2b, a total of 27 participants (17 females)
were recruited from the MRC-CBU volunteer panel, with a mean
age of 24 (SD¼6) years.
4.1.2. Materials and procedure
The stimuli and procedure were identical to those of Experi-
ment 1, except that Conceptual primes (or Unrelated primes)
were used in all four blocks; i.e., Repetition primes were never
used. In the Prime Visibility Test, only two response options
(candidate primes) were displayed, corresponding to the
Conceptual Prime and the Unrelated Prime.
4.1.3. Data analyses
The data were analysed as in Experiment 1, with the exception
of the Priming Type (Conceptual, Repetition) factor, which no
longer applied since all blocks were Conceptual Priming blocks.
4.2. Results (Experiment 2a)
4.2.1. Proportion of trials
One participant was removed because their Pr score for Rs (.05)
was three standard deviations smaller than the mean of the other
participants (leaving 24 participants). The mean proportions of
responses in each condition are shown in Table 3. For R judgments,
overall accuracy (Pr) was .59, which was signiﬁcantly greater than
zero, t(23)¼16.9, po .001. For K judgments, accuracy was .39, which
was also signiﬁcantly greater than zero, t(23)¼10.8, po .001.7
For ‘‘old’’ judgments, the 2 (Memory Judgment)2 (Study
Status)2 (Prime Status) ANOVA revealed no main effects or inter-
actions involving Prime Status—i.e., no priming effects (though the
main effect of Study Status and the interaction between Memory
Judgment and Study Status were both signiﬁcant, F(1,23)s425.6,
pso.001). Priming scores for each condition separately were not
signiﬁcant either for R or K judgments to either Studied or Unstudied
items, t(23)so1.25, ps4.22 (see Supplementary Fig. 1, top panel).
Table 4
Mean of median RT in Experiments 2a and 2b (with standard deviation in brackets) to Studied or Unstudied words that were given each type of Memory Judgement (R, K,
New) for each Prime Status (Primed/Unprimed). -¼ insufﬁcient numbers to estimate RT (see Table 1).
Memory judgement Experiment 2a (Conceptual) Experiment 2b (Conceptual)
Studied Unstudied Studied Unstudied
Primed Unprimed Primed Unprimed Primed Unprimed Primed Unprimed
R 825 (140) 822 (132) – – 874 (135) 876 (120) – –
K 1032 (185) 1010 (218) – – 1099 (182) 1087 (213) – –
New – – 851 (140) 860 (151) – – 863 (132) 870 (134)
Hits False Alarms
ed
 (%
)
R
K
iK
R
K
iK
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As in Experiment 1, an ANOVA on median RTs for correct ‘‘old’’
and ‘‘new’’ decisions was performed (excluding one participant
with insufﬁcient trials; Table 4). No main effect or interaction
involving Prime Status (i.e., priming effect) was signiﬁcant.Hits False Alarms
P
rim
ed
 –
U
np
rim
R
K
R
K4.2.3. Prime visibility test
Thirteen of the 24 participants (54%) reported being aware
that there were ‘‘hidden’’ words in the experiment; eight of these
‘‘aware’’ participants reported being able to identify prime words
on some trials. In the Prime Visibility Test, mean performance was
79.0% (SD¼15.8%), which was signiﬁcantly better than chance
(50%), t(23)¼9.19, po .001. Performance did not differ between
Primed (M¼78.6%, SD¼19.8%) and Unprimed (M¼79.3%, SD¼
16.2%) conditions (tso1).P
rim
ed
 –
U
np
rim
ed
 (%
)
iKiK
Fig. 6. Priming (% of trials called ‘‘old’’ for Primed–Unprimed) as a function of
Studied (Hits; left panels) or Unstudied (False Alarms; right panels) items, and
separately for participants who reported being unaware of primes (lower panels),
for R (red) vs. K (green) judgments when averaged across Experiments 2a and 2b.
The two bars for K judgments are based on raw numbers (dark green) or under
independent (IRK) scoring (‘iK’, light green; see main text). Note only Conceptual
primes were used (cf. Experiment 1). Error bars are 95% conﬁdence intervals.4.3. Results (Experiment 2b)
4.3.1. Proportion of trials
The mean proportions of responses in each condition are shown
in Table 3. For R judgments, overall accuracy (Pr) was .53, which was
signiﬁcantly greater than zero, t(26)¼13.6, po .001. For K judg-
ments, accuracy was .36, which was also signiﬁcantly greater than
zero, t(26)¼10.1, po .001.8
For ‘‘old’’ judgments, the 2 (Memory Judgment)2 (Study
Status)2 (Prime Status) ANOVA again revealed no main effects
or interactions involving Prime Status—i.e., no priming effects.
Priming scores for each condition separately were not signiﬁcant
either for R or K judgments to either Studied or Unstudied items,
t(23)so1.41, ps4 .17 (see Supplementary Fig. 1, bottom panel).4.3.2. Response time
The ANOVA on median RTs (after removing one participant with
o2 trials per cell; Table 4) did not reveal any signiﬁcant main effect
or interactions involving Prime Status (i.e., priming effects).4.3.3. Prime visibility test
Sixteen of the 27 participants (59%) reported being aware that
there were ‘‘hidden’’ words in the experiment; eight of these ‘‘aware’’
participants reported being able to identify prime words on some
trials. In the Prime Visibility Test, mean performance was 78.0% (SD¼
15.8%), which was signiﬁcantly better than chance (50%), t(26)¼9.08,
po.001. Performance did not differ between Primed (M¼74.8%,
SD¼20.7%) and Unprimed (M¼80.3%, SD¼14.9%) conditions (tso1).8 For non-independent K, Pr¼ .12, which was signiﬁcantly greater than zero,
t(26)¼5.38, po .001. The ANOVA on proportion of responses produced no effects
involving Prime Status.4.4. Combined results (Experiments 2aþ2b)
For potential improved power, we averaged the priming scores
across Experiments 2a and 2b. However, there were still no
signiﬁcant priming effects (Fig. 6, top panel). Based on the effect
size from Experiment 1, a post hoc power analysis suggested that
with the combined 51 participants, the power to detect the (one-
tailed) increase in R Hits following conceptual primes was 89%.
A further ANOVAwith an additional factor distinguishing participant
groups that did (n¼30), or did not (n¼21), subjectively report
awareness of primes in Experiments 2a–2b again failed to reveal any
signiﬁcant effects involving Prime Status, Fso1. The same was true
when analysing the ‘‘unaware’’ group separately, Fso1 (see Fig. 6,
bottom panel) or under non-independent scoring of K.
5. Discussion
Experiment 1, and Taylor et al. (in press), had shown a
surprising increase in R judgments (to studied items) following
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also experienced the effects of masked Repetition primes in other
blocks. Experiments 2a and 2b were attempts to replicate this
effect, but only ever using Conceptual primes. Despite the fact
that this entailed twice as many trials to estimate the effects of
Conceptual primes (relative to Experiment 1), and twice as many
participants (when collapsing across Experiments 2a and 2b), we
failed to ﬁnd any priming effects. These null results did not seem
to depend on whether participants were aware of the presence of
the masked primes. We consider possible explanations for this
discrepancy between experiments in the General Discussion.6. General discussion
The initial impetus of this paper was the unexpected ﬁnding in
Experiment 1 that masked, semantically related (conceptual)
primes increased participants’ tendency to indicate that studied
items in a recognition task were ‘‘remembered’’ (i.e., given an ‘‘R’’
judgment; Tulving, 1985). This ﬁnding does not sit easily with
current conceptions of recollection, given that previous interpre-
tations of such masked priming of test items have been couched
in terms of familiarity instead (e.g., Jacoby & Whitehouse, 1989;
Rajaram, 1993; Rajaram & Geraci, 2000), and that familiarity has
been most strongly tied to conceptual ﬂuency (Yonelinas, 2002).
In Section 3, we proposed one hypothetical interpretation, in
terms of an increased probability of retrieving an episodic trace
when there are multiple retrieval cues that overlap with seman-
tically related concepts that were encoded together with the
target item during study. This hypothesis is based on our present
deﬁnition of recollection as a form of cued recall in which new
information from episodic memory is retrieved, and assumes that
participants use the R judgment appropriately in such cases. It is
consistent with our ﬁndings that this conceptual priming of R
judgments only occurs for Studied items (not Unstudied false
alarms) and with our recent fMRI ﬁnding that activity in regions
of the parietal cortex, which has been associated with recollec-
tion, correlate with the size of this conceptual-priming effect
(Taylor et al., in press). It is also a productive hypothesis that can
be tested in future, for example using cued recall (see Section 3).
However, the conceptual-priming effect was only found when
conceptual primes occurred in the same experiment as did
repetition primes (albeit in separate blocks): i.e., the same effect
was not found in Experiment 2a/2b, where participants were only
ever exposed to conceptual primes. We do not think the sig-
niﬁcant increase in R judgments to studied items following
conceptual primes in Experiment 1 was a Type I error, because
we replicated the same behavioural effect (and the interaction
between Prime-Type, Memory Judgment and Prime Status) in an
independent group of participants in Taylor et al. (in press). It is
possible that the failures to replicate this effect in Experiments 2a
and 2b were Type II errors, though again, a post hoc estimate
showed that the combined data from both experiments had a
reasonably high statistical power (89%) to detect such an effect.
Therefore, we assume that the exposure to repetition primes (the
only procedural difference of note between Experiment 1 and
Experiments 2a and 2b) is a critical factor in explaining these
data. This prompted us to reconsider the methodological issues
surrounding estimating recollection within the recognition mem-
ory paradigm (as reviewed in Section 1.1), particularly in relation
to the R/K procedure, as expanded below.
6.1. Methodological considerations
One possible explanation of the combined results of Experi-
ments 1 and 2 is that, given only two response options followingan old decision (i.e., R versus K), and given two qualitatively
different experiences of ﬂuency (i.e., following repetition versus
conceptual primes), participants are forced to use one memory
judgment for ﬂuency of one type of processing, and the other
judgment for ﬂuency of another type of processing—resulting in
the cross-over interaction between Priming Type and Memory
Judgment that we found in Experiment 1 (and in Taylor et al., in
press). In other words, this interaction may be an ‘‘artefact’’ of the
binary (either–or) nature of the R/K procedure. In this case, one
might not expect to ﬁnd such a double dissociation if one used the
parallel R–K ratings procedure of Higham and Vokey (2004; see
also Brown & Bodner, 2011; Kurilla & Westerman, 2008), though
even then, the restriction to only two types of ratings might
favour the same type of dissociation. Other alternatives would be
to allow a third option (e.g., of guesses; Tunney & Fernie, 2007, in
case the present R–K dissociation could be simply a difference in
recognition conﬁdence following conceptual vs. repetition prim-
ing), or to allow indication of different types of recollection (e.g.,
of internal vs. external source), or possibly even to minimise
recollection using the modiﬁed R/K procedure of Montaldi et al.
(2006).
However, even this methodological interpretation, in terms of
binary R/K categories, does not explain why participants hap-
pened to choose the R category for Conceptual primes and the K
category for Repetition primes (or at least, why the majority of
participants did so, such that the interaction between R/K and
Priming Type was reliable over participants). Nor does it explain
why the Conceptual Priming effect (in Experiment 1 and Taylor
et al., in press) was restricted to Studied items, whereas the
Repetition Priming effect on K judgments was found, and has
previously been found, for both Studied items (Hits) and Unstu-
died items (False Alarms). Most importantly however, this meth-
odological account does not explain why conceptual primes
increased neither R nor K judgments signiﬁcantly in Experiments
2a and 2b: even if the participants in these experiments did not
experience the ﬂuency induced by repetition primes, with which
to contrast the ﬂuency induced by conceptual primes, they should
have shown an increase in one type of memory judgment (or at
least on the number of ‘‘old’’ judgments overall, collapsing R and
K judgments).
6.2. Theoretical considerations
A comprehensive explanation of the present results and those of
Taylor et al. (in press) must therefore account for both the evidence
that the Conceptual Priming effect appears to be a bona ﬁde increase
in recollection (rather than an artefact of the binary-response
procedure used), and that this effect can disappear in certain
stimulus list contexts (i.e., when only Conceptual and Unrelated
primes are present). Effects of list context in priming are not
uncommon: For example, in a lexical decision task with masked
semantic primes, the ratio of related- to unrelated-prime trials
modulates the size of RT priming effects, even when participants
are unaware of the masked primes (Bodner & Masson, 2003).
List-context effects could arise by affecting how primes are
processed, e.g., whether primes are passively ‘accepted’, attended, or
actively inhibited, or by affecting decision processes, such as response
criteria or, perhaps most pertinent to the present data, the attribution
process. In the present study, two ﬁndings are consistent with the
locus of the list-context effect being how primes are processed. First,
in the Prime Visibility Test (Experiment 1), Conceptual (and Unre-
lated) Primes were more visible than Repetition primes (signiﬁcantly
so in Taylor et al., in press), suggesting that primes would have been
on average more visible in Experiments 2a and 2b (Conceptual
Priming only) than in Experiment 1 (Conceptual and Repetition
Priming). Second, there were no priming effects on RT in Experiments
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of test-cue processing in those experiments. Taken together, these
ﬁndings are consistent with participants in Experiments 2a and 2b
(Conceptual priming only) being more likely to see primes, and
perhaps ﬁnding the primes distracting or of no use, actively
ignoring/inhibiting them, preventing priming of both RT and pro-
portion of trials. However, it seems unlikely that a conscious
strategy of inhibiting primes could fully account for the results of
Experiments 2a and 2b since the subset of participants who reported
being unaware of the masked primes still showed no evidence of
Conceptual priming (and more generally, prime awareness has not
interacted with priming effects in any of our experiments). Further,
we note that null priming effects in RT are difﬁcult to interpret in
the present procedure because response accuracy is emphasised
over speed.
An attribution account, on the other hand, does not require
conscious awareness of primes; rather – as with the ‘binary-response
artefact’ explanation considered in the previous section – it pertains
to the participants’ experience of ﬂuency as a consequence of
priming. If such an attribution is indeed necessary for recollection
to occur (or at least for a ‘‘Remember’’ judgment to be made), then
the critical difference between Experiment 1 (and Taylor et al., in
press) and Experiments 2a and 2b could be the likelihood of such an
attribution occurring. In Experiments 2a and 2b, Conceptual primes
occur on 50% of trials—twice as often as in Experiment 1 (and Taylor
et al., in press). This higher proportion of conceptually primed trials
might have caused participants to discount conceptual ﬂuency as a
memory signal, or in terms of the explanation proposed in the
Section 3 (Fig. 5), it might have biased participants against using
the retrieval of other, semantically related concepts as the basis for a
‘remember’ judgment. This account ﬁts well with the notion that, at
least in the case of familiarity, ﬂuency must be unexpectedly high,
relative to that of other items, in order for a (mis)attribution
to memory to occur (e.g., Whittlesea & Williams, 1998, 2001).
A challenge to this account is the ﬁnding that Repetition priming
of K responses occurs when such primes occur on 50% of trials
(e.g., Woollams et al., 2008); however, it is possible that the criteria
for attributions of recollection and of familiarity are independent, and
differentially inﬂuenced by parameters such as the proportion of
related items.
The role of the attribution process in recollection has received
little attention; however, Andrew Mayes and colleagues rather
presciently raised this issue many years ago (Mayes, Gooding, &
van Eijk, 1997). They hypothesised that one could easily confuse
an imagined item-context association with a remembered one,
and that ‘‘recollection must involve representing the item-context
association and making an attribution that one is remembering.’’
Attributions of recollection might become particularly apparent
when the ‘‘context’’ under consideration is internally generated
(see discussion of internal vs. external source information in the
Section 1.1), such as when participants engage in relatively deep
semantic processing at Study and then use retrieval of semantically-
related information at Test as a basis for ‘‘Remember’’ judgments.
Note that the ﬂuency that is attributed to remembering could still
refer to the ease of retrieving new information (from multiple cues,
as in Section 3), rather than the ease of processing an external
stimulus (as is perhaps the case for attributing ﬂuency to famil-
iarity). Indeed, the ﬂuency of retrieving new information in response
to a cuemay be a characteristic of episodic retrieval, to which we are
ﬁnely tuned (spontaneous occurrence of which could be further
used to trigger a retrieval mode; Tulving, 1983). These ideas clearly
need further development. Nonetheless, this attribution account
makes a prediction for future studies: The conceptual priming effect
on ‘‘Remember’’ responses should be modulated by task demands
that affect the attribution process (e.g., proportion of related items,
instructions about primes, etc.), whereas concomitant primingeffects on neural indices of recollection (e.g., activity in parietal
cortex, amplitude of the late parietal ERP component; see, e.g.,
Taylor et al., in press) should not be so modulated (rather other
regions/indices might be modulated, reﬂecting the attribution
process).
6.3. Conclusion
Though we have not yet resolved the precise explanation
(or boundary conditions) for conceptual primes to increase R judg-
ments, the experiments reported here clearly illustrate the theoretical
point made in Section 1.1 that estimating recollection and familiarity
within the recognition memory paradigm is a difﬁcult enterprise,
which requires detailed task analysis and consideration of several
methodological issues. Thus the application of ‘‘standard’’ paradigms
(such as the R/K procedure), and even ‘‘standard’’ measurement
models, such as the independent, dual-process model (e.g.,
Yonelinas, 2002), should be qualiﬁed by detailed task analyses, and
ideally detailed process models (e.g., Norman, 2010); a message that
we believe resonates with the continued work of Andrew Mayes and
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